SIJAL · DECISION FILE Record 15 · Final English
Record 15 · Final

Should our endowment's investment committee allocate 10% of the portfolio to private credit funds over the next three years?

Illustrative example: the institution and figures are hypothetical; the session is real.

The question

Should our endowment's investment committee allocate 10% of the portfolio to private credit funds over the next three years?

The verdict

No.

The Court answered the question in the negative.

Supported, with dissent

2 of 3 lenses · read from the Court record

What to do

Decline the 10% private credit allocation and retain the current investment-grade bond and sukuk holdings until the committee builds the capability to evaluate and monitor private credit managers.

The weight of the judges

7 for11 against

11 of 18 judge votes against (61%)

  • Lens 1 5-1
  • Lens 2 2-4
  • Lens 3 0-6

Finalized 11 Nov 2026, 14:30 UTC

Why this verdict

The full argument behind it: its grounds, the principle that links them, what that rests on, the strongest point against it, and when it would not hold.The full argument behind it. Tap a part to open it.

  1. 1

    Fee drag can erase the entire return advantage Total effective fees average nearly 4% of NAV for direct lending managers, and a fund-of-funds layer compounds this into an 839-basis-point drag on gross returns. For a strategy targeting 8-10% gross, fees alone can eliminate every basis point of advantage over investment-grade bonds.

  2. 2

    Committee lacks the expertise to govern private credit The IMF flags private credit opacity and infrequent mark-to-market as making oversight structurally difficult even for sophisticated investors, a bar this quarterly-meeting committee does not clear. With no in-house private markets team and 5-7 year lock-ups, any governance failure is irreversible.

An institution should only enter an illiquid, opaque asset class when it can reliably access net returns that justify the risk.

Smoothed spending rules and ample liquid buffer limit drawdown risk Endowments widely use smoothing mechanisms such as multi-year moving averages that prevent payout spikes during downturns. With only 10% locked up, roughly USD 360 million in liquid assets remains against an USD 18 million annual payout, leaving substantial headroom.

Its opening argument

The endowment can carry private credit's lock-ups precisely because its liquidity architecture, properly stress-tested, remains intact after the proposed 10% commitment. Start with the numbers. A USD 400 million portfolio committing USD 40 million to private credit leaves 45% in public equities, 35% in…
Read its full case

  • Evidence establishes that a comparably sized endowment with a 10% private credit allocation and a 4.5% spending rule successfully maintained spending commitments through a multi-year downturn, confirming that liquidity headroom is sufficient in practice.
  • Verified data shows that Gulf public equity bid-ask spreads widen severely enough during regional stress to materially impair liquidation of the liquid buffer, making the execution shortfall large enough to threaten annual disbursements.
  • Evidence confirms that this endowment's board approval requirement for payout cuts functions as a binding constraint that overrides smoothing mechanisms, meaning spending obligations cannot in practice be reduced under severe stress.
All 8 open questions the judges recorded
  • Capital-call pacing and cumulative multi-year drawdown effects on the liquid buffer are not quantified by any established source.

    Raised by 10 judges
  • Whether Gulf public equity spreads and liquidity under stress would erode realisable proceeds is not evidenced either way.

    Raised by 6 judges
  • No verified data show private credit default and loss experience through a downturn relative to investment-grade bonds.

    Raised by 6 judges
  • How often adviser conflicts of interest arise, and whether committees can detect them, is not established.

    Raised by 6 judges
  • No evidence shows how often covenant breaches in private credit funds are detected late or how often escalation triggers actually fire.

    Raised by 3 judges
  • The probability that this specific endowment, using an external adviser without in-house private markets staff, would achieve median or above-median manager selection outcomes is not established by any evidence in the record.

    Raised by 1 judge
  • Whether the Commonfund fund-of-funds fee data (34 basis points for endowments of this size) applies to private credit structures specifically, rather than to more liquid alternative strategies, is not resolved in the record.

    Raised by 1 judge
  • No verified statistics on the frequency with which external adviser conflicts of interest cause material harm to unsophisticated institutional principals in private credit mandates are established, making the severity of the delegation risk unquantifiable.

    Raised by 1 judge

THE JUDGES

Three lenses. Six judges in each.

METHOD

Independent aggregated judgment, as in the Good Judgment Project (IARPA ACE programme)

1

Liquidity and downside: can the endowment carry private credit's lock-ups and default risk through a downturn without breaking its annual spending commitments?

5-1

Won by the case for, majority.

2

Return after fees: does private credit's expected net return justify it over the investment-grade bonds and sukuk the endowment already holds?

2-4

Won by the case against, majority.

3

Governance and capability: does the committee have the expertise and oversight to select and monitor private credit managers?

0-6

Won by the case against, unanimous.

Decision record 15 Finalized 11 Nov 2026, 14:30 UTC Fingerprint 46d023af5cfecac6f9fd33d70ba125b70778426eeaba95a6b050eb9cf41c0a37

Sources read: 4 of 4

Argument: cross-examination debate, with an assigned devil's advocate. Adjudication: independent aggregated judgment, as in the Good Judgment Project (IARPA ACE programme). Report: ICD 203 analytic standards; the recommendation is set out in Toulmin's structure of argument.

Appendix: the judges' rulings